MW: Last time we reviewed the four adjoints:
Category Archives: Logic
First-Order Categorical Logic 9
Filed under Categories, Conversations, Logic
First-Order Categorical Logic 8
MW: We’re reviewing hyperdoctrines, which are specially nice functors B: FinSet → BoolAlg. When we have such a functor, any map f of finite sets gives a homomorphism of boolean algebras, B(f). But we’ve seen this is a morphism and a functor. (“It’s a floor wax and a dessert topping!”) What do you think about the term “adjoint morphism”? It might help keep the two levels straight.
Filed under Categories, Conversations, Logic
First-Order Categorical Logic 7
MW: John, it’s been eons since we last discussed First-Order Categorical Logic: not since September 2019! (I read a lot of Russian novels during the break.) But New Year’s seems like a good time to resume the tale.
JB: Yes indeed! It’s been a long time, and it’s mostly my fault. Let’s see if we can get back up to speed.
Filed under Categories, Conversations, Logic
Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic 31
MW: Last time we learned about the “back-and-forth” condition for two countable structures M and N for a (countable) language L:
Filed under Conversations, Peano Arithmetic
Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic 30
MW: Time to finish off Enayat’s Theorem 7:
Theorem 7: Every countable recursively saturated model N of PA+ΦT is a T-standard model of PA.
Filed under Conversations, Peano Arithmetic
Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic 29
MW: We’re still going through Enayat’s proof of his Theorem 7:
Theorem 7: Every countable recursively saturated model N of PA+ΦT is a T-standard model of PA.
Filed under Conversations, Peano Arithmetic
Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic 28
MW: I ended the last post with a puzzle. Here it is again, in more detail.
Filed under Conversations, Peano Arithmetic
Nonstandard Models of Arithmetic 27
MW: Enayat’s second major result is:
Theorem 7: Every countable recursively saturated model of PA+ΦT is a T-standard model of PA.
Filed under Conversations, Peano Arithmetic
Very Unique
Everyone has their pet peeves, and peeves about language abound. My pet peeve is with people who object that “very unique” is illogical. For example, this pithy statement:
Uniqueness is a binary condition. Something is unique or it is not. There are no degrees of uniqueness. Something cannot be partly unique, mostly unique, very unique, etc.
