Author Archives: Michael Weiss

From Kepler to Ptolemy 23

Prev TOC Next

The Astronomia nova: “One Sustained Argument”

In his classic The Sleepwalkers, Arthur Koestler said this about the Astronomia nova:

Kepler was incapable of exposing his ideas methodically, text-book fashion; he had to describe them in the order they came to him, including all the errors, detours, and the traps into which he had fallen. The New Astronomy is written in an unacademic, bubbling baroque style, personal, intimate, and often exasperating. But it is a unique revelation of the ways in which the creative mind works.

Scolarship has decisively rebutted Koestler’s description. Gingerich first suggested this, after examining some of Kepler’s unpublished manuscripts:

Most commentators have assumed, because of Kepler’s sequential and at times autobiographical style, that Kepler has spared no detail in the chronicle of his researches. Examination of the manuscript material … shows, on the contrary, that the book evolved through several stages and represents a much more coherent plan of organization than a mere serial recital of his investigations would allow.

Stephenson’s Kepler’s Physical Astronomy stated this more forcefully:

This profoundly original work has been portrayed as a straightforward account of converging approximations, and it has been portrayed as an account of gropings in the dark. Because of the book’s almost confessional style, recounting failures and false trails along with successes, it has in most cases been accepted as a straightforward record of Kepler’s work. It is none of these things. The book was written and (I shall argue) rewritten carefully, to persuade a very select audience of trained astronomers that all the planetary theory they knew was wrong, and that Kepler’s new theory was right. The whole of the Astronomia nova is one sustained argument, and I shall make what I believe is the first attempt to trace that argument in detail.

Donahue says this in the introduction to his translation:

That is, although Kepler often seems to have been chronicling his researches, the Astronomia nova is actually a carefully constructed argument that skillfully interweaves elements of history and (it should be added) of fiction. Taken as history, it is often demonstrably false, but Kepler never intended it as history. His introduction to the “Summaries of the Individual Chapters” makes his intentions abundantly clear. Caveat lector!

Finally, Voelkel dug deeper into how and why Kepler composed the book as he did. Legal obstacles intervened. And Kepler’s correspondence with David Fabricius showed him what aspects of the “new astronomy” would prove most difficult for his fellow astronomers to swallow.

Even so, the Astronomia nova roughly follows the path that Kepler took. In broad strokes:

True Sun:
Use this instead of the mean sun (aka center of Earth’s orbit).
Imitation of the Ancients:
Aka the vicarious hypothesis. A model for an eccentric circular orbit for Mars, with equant. Good for longitudes, but not distances or latitudes.
Earth’s Orbit:
An eccentric circle with an equant. Also, bisection of eccentricity: the center of the orbit is midway between the sun and the equant.
Speed Laws:
The inverse distance law, giving way to the area law.
The Ellipse:
First realization: the orbit is an oval. Then many false starts, crowned finally with success.

Voelkel reveals the main deviations between this outline and the actual history. (1) Kepler started investigating Earth’s orbit before his work on the vicarious hypothesis. (2) In general, the phases were more entangled. (3) Far from “including all the errors, detours, and the traps” (as Koestler said), Kepler exercised selection with a purpose. As he put it himself: “What success came of that labor [i.e., his investigations], it would be boring and pointless to recount. I shall describe only so much of that labor of four years as will pertain to our methodical enquiry.”

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Astronomy, History

Set Theory Jottings 20. Consistency of GCH and AC: Overview

Prev TOC Next

In 1938 Gödel published “The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum-Hypothesis”. This paper introduces the constructible universe, a so-called inner model of ZFC. This is a class L that satisfies the ZFC axioms, plus GCH, provided that V satisfies the ZF axioms. So if ZF is consistent, then so is ZF+AC+GCH.

The 1938 paper did not employ classes in the formal sense, as the context was ZF set theory. A couple of years later Gödel elaborated his proof in a monograph, introducing the NBG axioms and treating classes formally. We’ll stick with the ZF version.

Cohen’s book gives a more readable account of all this. I will quote from it from time to time.

The proof rests on five foundation stones:

First-order logic:
Concepts such as sentence, satisfaction, model, and definability all play key roles.
Constructible Sets:
Gödel’s universe of constructible sets is the centerpiece of the whole argument; it revolves around the notion of definability. The next post introduces the constructible universe.
Absoluteness:
Certain concepts of set theory are absolute, in that they do not depend on the surrounding model. Absoluteness is covered in a later post.
Reflection Principles:
At two pivotal points, Gödel made use of a version of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. The theorem says that we can always find a “small” submodel that “reflects” certain aspects of a larger model.
Mostowski Collapsing Lemma:
At a key point in the argument, Gödel needed to remove “superfluous” sets from a model; he applied the Mostowski collapsing lemma. (Cohen calls it “the trivial result… concerning ∈-isomorphisms”.)

The following sections give the argument in broad strokes. For the logic background, I’ll refer to my notes Basics of First-order Logic (henceforth Logic Notes).

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Uncategorized

Set Theory Jottings 19. GCH implies AC.

Prev TOC Next

Sierpiński’s Theorem: GCH implies AC

I had a look at the version of the proof in Cohen (§IV.12). Sierpiński was a clever fellow, and he came up with a few tricks that would be hard to motivate.

Here I will try to imagine how Sierpiński could have devised his proof. Cohen does offer one bit of intuition:

The GCH is a rather strong assertion about the existence of various maps since if we are ever given that ABP(A) then there must be a 1–1 map either from B onto A or from B onto P(A). Essentially this means that there are so many maps available that we can well-order every set.

Let A be the set we wish to well-order. Let’s write AB to mean there is an injection from A into B. GCH tells us that for any U,

AUP(A) implies UA or U≡𝒫(A)

If U is well-ordered, then UA and U≡𝒫(A) both imply that A can be well-ordered, the latter because A is naturally imbedded in 𝒫(A). But this is too simple an approach: AU already makes A well-ordered for a well-ordered U, so if we could show the antecedent we’d be done—we wouldn’t need GCH to finish the job.

Let’s not assume U is well-ordered, but instead suppose it contains a well-ordered set. Say we could show that

AW+A≤𝒫(A)

for a well-ordered set W, where ‘+’ stands for disjoint union. (That is, W×{0}∪A×{1}, or some similar trick to insure disjointness.) Then we’d have

W+A≡𝒫(A) or W+AA

Now, if W+A≡𝒫(A), then we ought to have W≡𝒫(A), just because A is “smaller” than 𝒫(A) (in some sense)—W should just absorb A, if W is “big enough”. Also, if W is “big enough” then that should exclude the other arm of the choice, where W+AA. And if W≡𝒫(A), then 𝒫(A) and so also A can be well-ordered, as we have seen.

At this point Hartog’s theorem shows up at the door. This gives us a well-ordered set W with

W≤𝒫4(A) and WA

So we have

AW+A ≤𝒫4(A)+A ?≡? 𝒫4(A)

(where ?≡? means that the equivalence needs to be proven). WA excludes W+AA, good. Let’s postpone the issue of the ‘?’. Deal first with the problem that the bounds are not tight enough for GCH to apply. We fix that by looking at:

𝒫3(A)≤W+𝒫3(A)≤𝒫4(A)+𝒫3(A) ?≡? 𝒫4(A)

So if W+𝒫3(A)≡𝒫4(A), we ought to have W≡𝒫4(A) and hence a well-ordering of A. What about the other case, W+𝒫3(A)≡𝒫3(A)? Ah, then we have

𝒫2(A)≤W+𝒫2(A)≤W+𝒫3(A)≡𝒫3(A)

and so we can repeat the argument: either W+𝒫2(A)≡𝒫3(A), which ought to make 𝒫3(A) well-ordered and hence also A well-ordered; or W+𝒫2(A)≡𝒫2(A), in which case we repeat the argument yet again. Eventually we work our way down to

AW+AW+𝒫(A)≡𝒫(A)

and W+AA is excluded since WA, and we are done.

All this relies on the intuition that if W+M≡𝒫(M), then we should have W≡𝒫(M): we used this with M=𝒫n(A) for n=0,…,3. Well, we can prove something a little weaker.

Lemma: If W+M≡𝒫(M)×𝒫(M), then W≥𝒫(M).

Proof: Suppose h:W+M→𝒫(M)×𝒫(M) is a bijection. Restrict h to M and compose with the projection to the second factor: π2⚬(hM):M→𝒫(M). Cantor’s diagonal argument shows that this map cannot be onto. (The fact that π2⚬(hM) might not be 1–1 doesn’t affect the argument.) So for some s0∈𝒫(M), we know that h(x) never takes the form (−,s0) for xM. In other words, the image of hW must include all of 𝒫(M)×{s0}. Therefore 𝒫(M)×{s0} can be mapped 1–1 to a subset of W. qed.

The missing pieces of the proof now all take the form of absorption equations. We know that 𝒫(M)×𝒫(M)≡𝒫(M+M)—as an equation for cardinals, 2𝔪2𝔪=22𝔪. If we had 2𝔪=𝔪, that would take care of that problem. The ?≡? above also takes the form 2𝔪+𝔪 ?=? 2𝔪, for 𝔪 the cardinality of 𝒫3(A).

The general absorption laws for addition depend on AC. But we do have these suggestive equations even without AC:

𝔞+ω+1 = 𝔞+ω, 2𝔪+1 = 2·2𝔪

and so if 𝔞+ω=𝔪 and 2𝔪=𝔟, then 2𝔟=𝔟. So let’s say we set B=𝒫(A+ω). Then we have 2B≡𝒫(A+ω+1)≡B (where 2B, of course, is the disjoint union of B with itself). Also BB+1≤2BB, so BB+1 and so 𝒫(B)≡2𝒫(B). So if we replace A with B, then all gaps in the argument are filled and we conclude that B can be well-ordered. But obviously A can be imbedded in B, so A also can be well-ordered. QED.

Ernst Specker proved a “local” version of Sierpiński’s Theorem: if 𝔪 and 2𝔪 both satisfy CH, then 2𝔪=ℵ(𝔪).

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Set Theory

Set Theory Jottings 18. The Axiom of Determinacy

Prev TOC Next

Just denying the axiom of choice doesn’t buy you much. If you’re going to throw away AC, you should add some powerful incompatible axiom in its place. The Axiom of Determinacy (AD) has been studied in this light.

Here’s one formulation. Let S be ℕ, i.e., the set of all infinite strings of natural numbers. Let GS. Alice and Bob play a game where at step 2n, Alice chooses a number s2n, and at step 2n+1, Bob chooses a number s2n+1. If s0s1s2…∈G, Alice wins, otherwise Bob wins. We say elements of G are assigned to Alice, and elements not in G are assigned to Bob. We’ll call the infinite strings results (of the game). Rather than think of G as a set of results, think of it as a function G:S→{Alice,Bob}.

A strategy for Alice tells her how to play each move. Formally, it’s a function from the set of all number strings of finite even length to ℕ. Likewise, a strategy for Bob maps number strings of finite odd length to numbers. A game is determined if Alice or Bob has a winning strategy, i.e., if the player follows the strategy then that player will win. The Axiom of Determinacy says that each game is determined.

Interesting thing about the proof that AC → ¬AD: it’s much easier using the well-ordering theorem instead of Zorn’s lemma.

First note that there are c=ℵ00 strategies (lumping together both Alice and Bob strategies), likewise c results. Assuming AC, well-order the strategies {Sα:α<ωc}. Here ωc is the least ordinal with cardinality c, so the set {α:α<κ} has cardinality less than c for each κ<ωc.

We construct a game G by inducting transfinitely through all the strategies, at step κ considering Sκ. Our goal is to assign some result to Alice or Bob that prevents Sκ from being a winning strategy. Say Sκ is an Alice strategy. Since we assign only one result at each step, fewer than c results have been assigned before step κ. However, there are c possible results if Alice follows Sκ, since Bob can play his numbers however he wants. So there exists a result where Alice follows Sκ but this result has not yet been assigned to either player. Assign it to Bob; this thwarts Sκ. If Sκ is a Bob strategy, just switch everything around. QED

The cardinality argument at the heart of this proof is harder to pull off with Zorn’s lemma (though possible, of course). (The exact same argument works with bit strings instead of strings of natural numbers, but for some reason AD is generally stated using ℕ instead of 𝒫(ℕ).)

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Set Theory

From Kepler to Ptolemy 22

Prev TOC Next

Libration Force

The Libration Force

Kepler coined the term “libration” for the oscillation of a planet’s distance from the Sun, approaching and receding.

He analyzed the libration for the eccentric-equant model, and found it unexpectedly complicated. Stephenson (p.78):

Many absurdities were involved in supposing that a planet could move, … non-uniformly, about the vacant center of the eccentric, with no guide except the apparent magnitude of the solar disk. Such complicated hypotheses, although designed to yield a perfectly simple eccentric circular path, were not physically credible…

Notice the remarkable thing that Kepler was doing here. He was analyzing motion on an eccentric circle, a model that had been in general use for nearly two millenia, apparently the simplest possible model with any empirical accuracy. He took apart this beautifully simple model and showed that as a physical process (and in the absence of solid spheres) it was really quite complicated, so complicated as to raise doubt about whether it could be real. He had performed so radical a reassessment by interpreting astronomy, for the first time, as a physical science.

Eventually Kepler achieved the elliptical orbit. Seeking a physical explanation, he hit on a magnetic force to produce the libration:

What if all the bodies of the planets are enormous round magnets? Of the earth (one of the planets, for Copernicus) there is no doubt. William Gilbert has proved it.

But to describe this power more plainly, the planet’s globe has two poles, of which one seeks out the sun, and the other flees the sun. So let us imagine an axis of this sort, using a magnetic strip, and let its point seek the sun. But despite its sun-seeking magnetic nature, let it remain ever parallel to itself in the translational motion of the globe…

Astronomia nova, Chapter 57.

The figure at the top of this post (taken from the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy) shows how it works. (The figure in the Astronomia nova has extra clutter.) Kepler explains:

[When] the strip is at A and E, there is no reason why the planet should approach or recede, since it holds its ends at equal distance from the sun, and would undoubtedly turn its point towards the sun if it were allowed to do so by the force that holds its axis straight and parallel. When the planet moves [counterclockwise] away from A, the point approaches the sun perceptibly, and the tail end recedes. Therefore, the globe begins perceptibly to navigate towards the sun. After E, the tail end perceptibly approaches and the head end recedes from the sun. Therefore, by a natural aversion, the whole globe perceptibly flees the sun…

Astronomia nova, Chapter 57. [I have changed the letters from C and F to A and E to match the diagram from the Epitome.]

Implicit: the magnetic force weakens with distance, so when the head
is closer to the Sun than the tail, the net force is attractive. And vice versa.

Kepler argued that this scheme gave the force a sinusoidal dependence on the longitude, and showed that this agreed with the libration for an elliptical orbit. Some aspects of this demonstration needed special pleading. Stephenson details the strong and the weak points of the reasoning (pp.110–117).

But: “The theory had one glaring flaw, however. The magnetic axis of the planet had to maintain a constant direction, perpendicular to the apsidal line.” (Stephenson, p.117.) The Earth’s rotational axis doesn’t come close to meeting this requirement. So why should we believe it holds for Mars? Kepler acknowledged the problem:

I will be satisfied if this magnetic example demonstrates the general possibility of the proposed mechanism. Concerning the details, however, I have my doubts. For when the earth is in question, it is certain that its axis, whose constant and parallel direction brings about the year’s seasons at the cardinal points, is not well suited to bringing about this reciprocation… And if this axis is unsuitable, it seems there is none suitable in the earth’s entire body, since there is no part of it that rests in one position while the whole body of the globe revolves in a ceaseless daily whirl about that axis.

As one possible out, Kepler appealed to a planetary mind.

Besides the radial libration, planets have a libration in latitude. This enmeshed the theory in further difficulties. Ever inventive, Kepler devised ad hockery around all these rough spots. But we have a contrast: we can trace a direct path from the whirlpool force to the area law. This cannot be said for Kepler’s libration theory. Kepler’s whirlpool speculations came years before the area law. The libration force came after the elliptical orbit.

There is a reason for this. You can justify the whirlpool force (more or less) using the conservation of angular momentum. Kepler’s libration force has no counterpart in Newtonian physics.

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Astronomy, History

From Kepler to Ptolemy 21

Prev TOC Next

Nature of the Whirlpool Force

Kepler was unsure of the nature of the whirlpool force. Sometimes he compares it to light, sometimes to magnetism. Three successive marginal notes in Chapter 33 lay out the analogy with light: “The kinship of the solar motive power with light”; “Whether light is the vehicle of the motive power”; “The motive power is an immaterial species of the of the solar body”.

The Latin term species calls for a short discussion. Donahue (in his glossary) says:

This word, related to the verb “specio” (see, observe) has an extraordinarily wide range of meaning. Its root meaning is is “something presented to view”, but it can also mean “appearance”, “surface”, “form”, “semblance”, “mental image”, “sort”, “nature”, or “archetype” … I have therefore thrown up my hands, admitted defeat, and declined to translate it at all.

while Stephenson (p.68,footnote) writes:

“Image” is our rendering of Kepler’s species, which has for the most part been left untranslated in other accounts. As Kepler used it the word seems to mean the appearance or visible manifestation of the sun…

Gilbert’s De magnete furnished Kepler with another analogy, and a clue. Chapter 34 is titled “The body of the sun is magnetic, and rotates in its space.” A few quotes from it:

The magnet … has filaments (so to speak) or straight fibers (seat of the motor power) extended throughout its length. …it is credible that [the sun] … has circular fibers all set up in the same direction, which are indicated by the zodiac circle.

… It is therefore plausible, since the earth moves the moon through its species and is a magnetic body, while the sun moves the planets similarly through an emitted species, that the sun is likewise a magnetic body.

Kepler postulates filaments or fibers in the Sun as the source of the whirlpool force. These encircle the Sun along the circles of latitude. The Sun rotates, and the image of the moving fibers acts upon the planet to move it in the same direction.

Inverse Square vs. Inverse Linear

Taking a modern perspective, we have an inverse square law whenever we have a conservation law plus spherical symmetry. But with cylindrical symmetry (like the whirlpool force), we can have an inverse linear dependence.

A nice modern analogy: dipole radiation. Feynman discusses this in his Lectures, Chapter I-28:

The gradually discovered properties of electricity and magnetism … showed that these forces … fell off inversely as the square of the distance… As a consequence, for sufficiently great distances there is very little influence of one system of charges on another.

… Maxwell [to obtain a consistent system] … had to add another term to his equations. With this new term there came an amazing prediction, which was that a part of the electric and magnetic fields would fall off much more slowly with the distance than the inverse square, namely, inversely as the first power of the distance!

It seems a miracle that someone talking in Europe can, with mere electrical influences, be heard thousands of miles away in Los Angeles. How is it possible? It is because the fields do not vary as the inverse square, but only inversely as the first power of the distance.

He goes on to treat the dipole radiator. That is, an antenna. The key point: We have charges moving up and down the antenna. What matters is how that motion looks to a distant observer:

… all we have to do is project the motion on a plane at unit distance. Therefore we find the following rule: Imagine that we look at the moving charge … like a painter trying to paint a scene on a screen at a unit distance … We want to see what his picture would look like. So we see a dot, representing the charge, moving about in the picture. The acceleration of that dot is proportional to the electric field.

At root we have a simple matter of geometry. Substituting an eye for the painter, and the eye’s retina for the screen, we have the diagram below. We have a vertical antenna of height H at distance r from the eye’s lens. The image of the antenna on the retina has height I. The antenna has unit distance 1 from the lens. Thus:

From similar triangles, I/1=H/r. In other words, the length of the image is inversely proportional to the first power of the distance.

Note also that the symmetry is cylindrical and not spherical. If the line of sight is not perpendicular to the antenna, the image will be smaller, vanishing completely when the line of sight passes through the antenna.

Returning from Feynman’s Lectures to Kepler’s Astronomia nova, we can resolve the inverse-square problem. Instead of an antenna, we have the Sun’s circular fibers. Instead of the retina, we have the image (species) of those fibers moving the planet. The whirlpool force results from the sum total of those fiber images. Each image’s contribution diminishes inversely with distance, so the sum does too. For all the difference in the physics, the basic geometry remains the same for Feynman’s dipole and Kepler’s whirlpool.

Stephenson (p.75) puts it this way:

The composite motion was directed along a circle parallel to the sun’s equator (the resultant of the images of all the filaments) and it was therefore weakened—at any latitude—only as this circle expanded, in the simple proportion of distance.

This one sentence states the matter more clearly than Kepler does in Chapter 36. Nonetheless, the ingredients are all there, just scattered through the chapter.

One more thing: is the the whirlpool force is confined to the ecliptic? Some authors say that Kepler claimed this. Stephenson shows, with quotes, that this is not true. But something like it holds effectively. A planet above the solar pole would see the fibers moving in all directions, and the net effect would be complete cancellation. At intermediate latitudes, you get partial cancellation. Only at the ecliptic does the planet get the full effect. Figure 14 (p.75) of Stephenson illustrates this:

A final footnote. In 1645 Ismael Boulliau published his Astronomia philolaica. In it he noted, as Kepler had, that the whirlpool force should exhibit an inverse square dependence on distance. But he ignored Kepler’s solution to this problem. On the strength of this, the noted historian Thony Christie credits him with being The man who inverted and squared gravity. I am far less inclined to award him this accolade.

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under Astronomy, History

Set Theory Jottings 17. Ordinals Revisited

Prev TOC Next

In post 13 I sketched proof by transfinite induction, and definition by transfinite recursion. Let’s take a closer look at that. By definition, < means ∈ for ordinals—treat that also as vernacular. Sometimes one symbol or the other makes the meaning clearer. We must keep in mind though that we have not shown that < is a well-ordering on Ω, or even a simple ordering.

Let Ω(x) be the formula for “x is an ordinal”, thus:

(∀u,v)(uvxux)
∧(∀u,vx)(u<v v<u u=v)
∧(∀ux)(¬u<u)
∧(∀u,vx)(¬(u<v v<u))
∧(∀u,v,wx)(u<v<w u<w)
∧(∀yx)(y≠∅ → ∃u(uy ∧ ∀v(¬(v<u vy))))

The first line says x is transitive, the next four lines say that < simply-orders x, and the last line says that < is a well-ordering on x. (Quite a bit of vernacular, but by now you should know how to deal with “uvx’’, for example.)

The clauses are not as economical as possible: for example, Foundation implies the third and last line, and a transitive irreflexive relation is automatically asymmetric, so even without Foundation we don’t need the fourth line. For the moment, we proceed without using Foundation.

Within an ordinal, ∈ well-orders; we want to bootstrap this to all of Ω. First an easy observation. Given a formula φ(x), if any β∈α satisfy φ, then there is a least such β. We need only invoke Separation to provide us with the set of all β∈α satisfying φ, and then appeal to the last clause in the definition of an ordinal.

How about smallest elements over all of Ω? That is,

∃αφ(α)→∃α(φ(α) ∧ ∀β(¬(β<α∧φ(β))))

(By vernacular convention, α and β are ordinals. Formally one begins “∃x(Ω(x)∧φ(x))…’’.)

Suppose ∃γφ(γ). If none of γ’s predecessors satisfy φ, then we’re done. Otherwise suppose φ(α) with α∈γ. Because γ is well-ordered, there is is an element of γ—let’s still call it α—such that α is the smallest element of the set {β∈γ:φ(β)}. We need to know that there are no ordinals, period, that satisfy φ and precede α. But if β was such an ordinal, we’d have β∈α∈γ. Since γ is transitive, we’d have β∈γ, and we’ve already ruled that out.

The contrapositive is transfinite induction. Letting ψ be ¬φ,

∀α((∀β<α)ψ(β)→ψ(α)) → ∀αψ(α)

With transfinite induction, we can show that Ω is simply-ordered. Only trichotomy presents any wrinkles. We induct on the property, “α is comparable with every ordinal.” Suppose this is true for all β<α. Let γ be an arbitrary ordinal. If γ<β or γ=β for some β∈α, then γ<α, since α is transitive (and < means ∈). Suppose then that β∈γ for all β∈α. That is, α⊆γ. If α=γ, we’re done. Suppose α⊂γ. Let δ be the smallest element of γ∖α. We will now show that α=δ, proving α∈γ, i.e., α<γ.

The key point: both α and δ are subsets of γ, and within γ, ∈ is a simple ordering. Extensionality kicks in: we have to prove x∈α↔x∈δ, or turned around, x∉δ↔x∉α. Now, α is an initial segment of γ because α is transitive. Therefore δ>x for all x∈α because δ∉α. So x∉δ implies x≥δ implies x∉α. On the other hand, x∉α implies x>y for all y∈α, again because α is an initial segment. Since δ is the least element of γ∖α, it follows that x≥δ, i.e., ¬x<δ, i.e., x∉δ. We’re done.

So < is a well-ordering on Ω, and we can trust our intuition about it (mostly).

Next consider transfinite recursion. The discussion in post 13 applies, with a few remarks. As before, we have a “rule” ρ(α,f,s) that assigns a value s to an ordinal α given as input a function f:α→···. Our rule is a formula, and may even include parameters. Thus: ρ(α,f,s,).

Suppose that for the parameter values = this formula is “function-like”; then we’re in business. One proves in ZF that the following condition

∀α,ρ(α,f,s,)
∧ ∀α,f,s,t (ρ(α,f,s,)∧ρ(α,f,t,)→s=t)

implies, for all α, the existence of a unique function gα:α+1→··· “obeying the recursion”. The proof uses transfinite induction, of course; also the set-existence axioms, especially Replacement. I won’t comb out all the hair, but essentially: if we have an “obedient” gβ for all β<α, Replacement plus Union plus the uniqueness allow you to combine all these gβ’s into one fα with domain α. Then you use ρ to assign a value to α, extending fα to gα.

The conclusion, even leavened with vernacular, is more than I’m prepared to write. But you get a theorem—technically, a different theorem for each formula ρ. (So it’s a theorem schema.) It has the form ∀(AB), where A is the above condition and B asserts the existence of g.

We don’t need to prove that the condition holds; rather, the theorem says that whenever it holds (perhaps only for some values of the parameters), then the conclusion holds. The proof does not require Choice: the ordinals are already well-ordered. As before, we also have a formula G(α,,s); if the condition holds for some c, then G(α,,s) assigns a unique s to every ordinal—a “function-like” thingy with “domain” Ω.

As a bonus, we can rehabilitate Cantor’s “proof” of the Well-Ordering Theorem. Let M be a set, and let c be a choice function for M. Our rule ρ says that the s assigned to α is c(M∖{f(β):β<α}), provided that the difference set is not empty. Otherwise we assign M to α. (We choose M simply because it is not an element of M.) We define G by transfinite recursion; informally, we can write Ĝ(α) for the value assigned to α. (I have left the parameters M and implicit.) If we never have Ĝ(α)=M, that means that G defines an injection of Ω into M, and inverting this gives us a map from M onto Ω. Replacement then says that Ω is a set. The Largest Ordinal paradox however proves this is not so. (The formal statement: ¬∃S x(Ω(x)↔xS).) Therefore for some α, gα maps α+1 1–1 onto M, and we’ve well-ordered M.

I’ve made a full meal of this argument. Typically, one would condense this discussion into a couple of sentences: “Given a choice function c, use it to define (by transfinite recursion) an injective function from an initial segment of Ω into M. As this function cannot be defined for all ordinals, it must map the ordinals less than some α onto M, and so M is well-orderable.”

While this proof resembles Cantor’s demonstration, it borrows essential features from Zermelo’s. Gone are the successive choices with their psychological aspect, replaced with a choice function. And the “union of partial well-orderings” in Zermelo’s 1904 proof lies buried inside the transfinite recursion.

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under History, Set Theory

Set Theory Jottings 16. Axioms of ZFC

Prev TOC Next

The Axioms of ZFC

The language of ZF (ℒ(ZF)) consists of basic first-order syntax, with a single binary predicate symbol ∈. Here is a list of the axioms, with a tag-line (an imprecise description) for each.

Extensionality:
Every set is determined by its elements.
Foundation:
All sets are built up in levels by starting with the empty set.
Pairs:
There is a set whose elements are any two given sets. (Or any one set.)
Union:
For every set, there is a set consisting of the union of its elements.
Power Set:
For every set, there is a set consisting of all its subsets.
Infinity:
There is an infinite set.
Replacement:
Given a set and a rule for replacing its elements, there is a set consisting of all these replacements.
Choice:
Given a set of pairwise disjoint nonempty sets, there is a set containing exactly one element from each of them.

Two more axioms:

Null Set:
There is a set with no elements.
Separation:
Given a set and a property, there is a set consisting of all the elements satisfying the property.

These are redundant. The version of Replacement we adopt implies Separation; Null Set follows from Pairs plus Separation. But they are historically important, and help understand ZFC.

Now for the formal, or at least more formal, statements. (I discussed “vernacular” in post 15. Recall that stands for stands for a list (t1,…,tn).)

Extensionality:

z(zxzy)→x=y

Using the defined symbol ⊆ (defined as ∀z(zxzy)), we could also write this as “xyyxx=y’’.

Foundation:

x(∃yx)(yx=∅)

Of course, ∩ and ∅ are defined terms, and (∃yx) is vernacular. Here is Foundation without using them:

xy(yx∧∀u(¬(uxuy)))

People sometimes call this Regularity. Foundation says there is an ∈-minimal element of x, that is, a yx none of whose elements belong to x. If that were false, we’d have an infinite descending chain xy1y2∋…. (Possibly it could end in a loop, i.e., ym=yn for some m<n.) But such an x is not “built up from ∅’’.

Foundation has an equivalent statement: There are no infinite descending ∈-chains. To prove this equivalence, you need Choice. The version above (due to von Neumann) avoids this issue, and is simpler to express.

Pairs:

xyz(z={x,y})

or without the defined term {x,y}:

xyzu(uz ↔(u=xu=y))

Since x=y is not excluded, this also covers singletons.

Null Set:

xyyx)

Union:

xu(u=⋃yxy)

or without the defined term ⋃

xuz(zu ↔∃y(zyyx))

In other words, the elements of the union are the elements of the elements of the original set.

Power Set:

xps(spsx)

Or in other words, p={s : sx}, just the kind of set-builder definition that was uncritically accepted before the paradoxes. The power set of x is denoted 𝒫(x). Without the defined term sx:

xps(sp↔∀y(ysyx))

Infinity:

w(∅∈w∧∀x(xwx∪{x}∈w))

We mentioned earlier the von Neumann representation for natural numbers: 0={∅}, 1={0}, 2={0,1}, etc. This axiom insures the existence of a set containing all the von Neumann natural numbers. I leave the vernacular-free expression of Infinity as an exercise for the fastidious.

Separation (sometimes called Subset) isn’t a single axiom, but an axiom schema. We have an instance of the schema for each formula φ(y,). For any set x and any choice of values  for , the instance says there is a set of all elements y of x satisfying φ(y,).

Separation:

 ∀xsy(ysyx∧φ(y,))

Separation justifies the use of the set-builder notation s={yx:φ(y,)}.

Replacement (sometimes called Substitution) is also an axiom schema, with an instance for each formula φ(y,z,). Suppose for some particular choice =, the formula φ(y,z,) defines z as a partial function φ° of y: Given y, there is at most one z making φ(y,z,) true. Then the range of φ° on any set x is a set.
Replacement:

x(∀y≤1z φ(y,z,) →∃w(w={φ°(y):yx}))

But the set-builder term is not justifiable by Separation. Eliminating it gives:

x[∀y≤1zφ(y,z,)
→∃wz(zw↔(∃yx)φ(y,z,))]

And we can eliminate ∃≤1z and ∃yx. We replace ∃≤1z with this:

uv(φ(y,u,)∧φ(y,v,)→u=v)

and (∃yx)φ(y,z,) with

y(yx ∧φ(y,z,))

This version of Replacement demands only that φ° be a partial function, not necessarily total. You can derive Separation from it. If φ(y,) is the separating property, then let ψ(y,z,) (for a particular =) define the partial function ψ°(y)=y when φ(y,) is true, and undefined when φ(y,) is false. Then applying ψ° to x gives the subset we want. Some authors use the “total” version of Replacement, and include Separation in their list of axioms.

Choice (AC) was the scene for major philosophical combat early in the 20th century, as we’ve seen. It’s easier to express than Replacement.

Choice:

x[(∀yx)y≠∅∧ (∀yx)(∀zx)(yzy∩z=∅)
→∃c(∀y∈x)#(c∩y)=1]

Eliminating some vernacular should be routine by now: y≠∅, yz=∅. As for #(cy)=1, this becomes

u(ucy∧∀v(vcyv=u))

where of course ucy is formally ucuy, likewise for v.

Another version of Choice does not require disjointness. It’s easy to express formally once you have the machinery of ordered pairs, and thus functions as sets of ordered pairs. It says: for every set x whose elements are all nonempty sets, there is a so-called choice function c such that c(y)∈y for all yx.

Unlike every other “set existence” axiom of ZFC, we can’t define c with set-builder notation, or indeed give any other explicit description of the choice function. We’ve seen how this lead to much distrust of AC. In 1938, Gödel showed if ZF is consistent, then ZFC is too. That calmed things down somewhat. I’ve cited Moore’s book before on the history of the Axiom of Choice.

Prev TOC Next

2 Comments

Filed under History, Set Theory

Set Theory Jottings 15. From Zermelo to ZFC: Formal Logic

Prev TOC Next

The Role of Formal Logic

In Zermelo’s original system, the Separation Axiom refers to a “definite property”. The Replacement Axiom refers to a “rule”. In 1922, Skolem proposed interpreting “definite” as “first-order definable”. So properties and rules are just formulas in the language of ZF, ℒ(ZF). With this clarification, ZFC assumes its modern form as a first-order theory.

ZF boasts a spartan vocabulary: just ∈ plus the basic symbols of first-order logic. Writing things out formally, with no abbreviations or short-cuts, rapidly snows us under unreadable expressions. We handle this (like everyone else) with semi-formal expressions; I like to call these “vernacular”. Copious hand-waving suggests how a masochist could write these out in the formal language ℒ(ZF).

Example: here’s how we say p=〈x,y〉={{x},{x,y}}, partially expanded:

a,b(p={a,b}∧a={x}∧b={x,y})

“∃a,b’’ is vernacular for “∃ab’’. Next we expand p={a,b} into

u(up↔(u=au=b))

and likewise for a={x} and b={x,y}.

A relation r is a set of ordered pairs, so more formally

(∀pr)∃a,b(p=(a,b))

which still has some vernacular. (∀pr)… more formally is ∀p(pr→…). Likewise, (∃xz)… in formal dress is ∃x(xz∧…).

To say f is a function with domain D, we start with the vernacular

f is a relation
∧ (∀(a,b)∈f)aD
∧ (∀aD) ∃!b((a,b)∈f)

“∀(a,b)∈f’’ expands to “(∀pf)∀a,b(p=(a,b)→…)’’. ∃!bφ(b), “exists a unique b satisfying φ’’, expands to ∃bφ(b)∧∀b,c(φ(b)∧φ(c)→b=c).

The vernacular f(x)=y becomes 〈x,y〉∈f. These should be enough to give you the flavor.

Often we have lists of variables, like x1,…xn. We write to reduce clutter; ∀ and ∃ have the obvious meanings.

When we get to the formal versions of Separation and Replacement, we’ll see how “property” and “rule” are made precise.

Coda

We’ve seen the informal use of “class” in ZF. This proved so convenient that NBG, a theory developed in succession by von Neumann, Bernays, and Gödel, gave a home to it. It turns out that NBG is a so-called conservative extension of ZFC: any formula of NBG that “talks only about sets” is provable in NBG iff it is provable in ZF.

In NBG, we still have only the symbol ∈ plus the basic logical symbols. However, certain members of the “universe” have the left-hand side of ∈ barred to them. If xy, then we say x is a set; anything that’s not a set is a proper class. So proper classes can have sets as elements, but cannot themselves be elements. The term class encompasses both sets and proper classes; in NBG, the variables range over classes.

Here’s how NBG skirts around Russell’s paradox. We can still write the formal expression R={x:xx}. This defines the class R, which is the class of all sets that are not elements of themselves. Is RR? No, because if it were, it would have to be a set that was not an element of itself. OK, if RR, doesn’t that mean that R satisfies the condition to be an element of R? No, not if R is a proper class—R contains only sets, no proper classes allowed!

Zermelo’s original system did not include Replacement and Foundation, although it did include Choice. Somewhat ahistorically, people use Z to refer to ZF minus Replacement, but including Separation. ZC is Z plus Choice.

ZF is a theory of “pure sets”. ZFA is “ZF with atoms”. An atom is an object that is not the null set but has no elements. The axioms of ZF can be modified to allow for this. Before the invention of forcing, Mostowski used ZFA to investigate theories without Choice.

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under History, Set Theory

Set Theory Jottings 14. From Zermelo to ZFC: Replacement and Foundation

Prev TOC Next

Replacement and Foundation

Thirteen years after Zermelo published his axioms, Fraenkel pointed out that they weren’t quite strong enough. For example, you couldn’t prove the existence of the set ⋃n∈ω𝒫n(0).

Fraenkel suggest the Axiom of Replacement (aka Substitution): If we have a way of “associating” with every element m of a set M a set Xm, then {Xm:mM} is a set. In other words, if you go through a set, replacing each element with another set, you get a set. The intuition: {Xm:mM} is “no bigger” than M, and so ought to be a set also.

Combined with Axiom of Unions, this is the gateway to big sets. Replacement gives us {𝒫n(0):n∈ω}, and then Union gives us Fraenkel’s set.

Zermelo agreed with Fraenkel for this addition to the axioms. Skolem also pointed out the need.

Using transfinite recursion, we now define the Cumulative Hierarchy:

V0 = ∅
Vα+1 = Vα∪𝒫(Vα)
Vλ = ⋃α<λ Vα

Fraenkel’s set is Vω.

(Two variations: it turns out that “Vα∪’’ isn’t neeeded in the second line, you get the same sets with “Vα+1=𝒫(Vα)’’. Some authors modify the definition so that their Vλ is the same as our Vλ+1.)

Power Set plus Replacement plus Union shows that all the Vα are sets. The rank of a set is where it first appears in the cumulative hierarchy, or more precisely: rk(X) is the least α with XVα+1. The “+1’’ is so that α has rank α.

How do we know that every set appears somewhere in the cumulative hierarchy? That brings us to our second additional axiom: Foundation.

Skolem noticed the need to exclude “pathological” sets, such as A={A} or infinite descending chains A1A2∋…. Such sets will never appear in any of the Vα’s. The Foundation Axiom does the trick.

von Neumann gave the most elegant version of Foundation: Every nonempty set contains an element disjoint from it. That is, for any set A, there is an aA with aA=∅. This a is minimal in the ∈ ordering of the elements of M. That’s another way to phrase it: Every nonempty set A has a minimal element in its ∈-ordering.

Foundation is equivalent to every set having a rank. Writing this the classy way, V=⋃α∈ΩVα. The proof of this takes a few steps; I’ll save it for the end of this post.

For so-called “ordinary mathematics”, you usually don’t need to go any higher than rank ω2. Example: the complex Hilbert space L2(ℝ3), beloved by analysts and physicists alike. We build up to this by contructing all the natural numbers, then the integers, rational numbers, and reals, ordered pairs and ordered triples of reals, then functions from the ordered triples to ordered pairs, and finally equivalence classes of these functions. (Recall that two L2 functions are identified if they agree except for a set of measure zero; hence, the actual elements of L2(ℝ3) are equivalence classes.) We have all the natural numbers by the time we get to Vω. If x,yVα, then the ordered pair 〈x,y〉∈Vα+2. So if AVα, then any subset of A×A is in Vα+3. Integers are often defined as sets of ordered pairs of natural numbers, rational numbers as sets of ordered pairs of integers, and real numbers as sets of rational numbers (Dedekind cuts). If I counted right, that puts all the elements of ℝ in Vω+7 and any subset of ℝ in Vω+8. The Hilbert space in question should belong to Vω+15, again if I haven’t miscounted.

Although sets of high rank aren’t “needed” by most mathematicians, it would be quite strange to impose a “rank ceiling” limitation on the power set axiom. Just maybe if Vω+1 were adequate—but it isn’t.

Without Choice, we cannot use von Neumann’s definition of card(M) as the least ordinal equivalent to M. An alternative is Scott’s trick: card(M) is the set of all sets of least rank equivalent to M. In other words, S∈card(M) iff SM and for all TM, rk(T)≥rk(S). This lacks the simplicity of von Neumann’s definition, but it’s the best we’ve got. Scott’s trick can be used for other purposes, e.g., to define the order type of a simply-ordered set.

Okay, let’s look at the equivalence of Foundation with V=⋃α∈ΩVα. We’ll need some machinery: transitive closures, ∈-induction, and the suprenum of a set of ordinals.

Recall that a set A is transitive if baA implies bA, i.e., aA implies aA. Every set A is contained in a transitive set called its transitive closure, tc(A). First we set f(A)=⋃aAa. Then set tc(A)=⋃n∈ωfn(A), where f0(A)=A. The transitive closure is the smallest transitive set containing A: A⊆tc(A), and if AB with B transitive, then tc(A)⊆B.

Suppose φ is a property where the following implication holds: If every element of A satisfies φ, then so does A. Then ∈-induction says that φ holds for all sets. Foundation justifies this. Suppose on the contrary that A is a non-φ set. Then some element of A is non-φ. Consider the subset S of tc(A) consisting of all non-φ elements. This is nonempty by hypothesis, so let sS be ∈-minimal in S. All the elements of s belong to tc(A) because tc(A) is transitive, so therefore all of s’s elements must satisfy φ (otherwise s wouldn’t be ∈-minimal). But then s must also satisfy φ, contradiction.

Lemma: If S is a set of ordinals, then ⋃α∈Sα is an ordinal. This is a set by the Union Axiom. That S is simply-ordered under ∈ is easy as pie. Foundation makes the proof of the well-ordering property trivial, though it’s not hard to prove without it. For ordinals, α⊆β is equivalent to α≤β (we’ll prove this in a later post), so S is an upper bound to all its elements. As usual, we call the least uppper bound to S its suprenum, denoted sup S.

Now suppose X is a set, and we associate an ordinal αx with each xX. Replacement says that {αx:xX} is a set; we denote its suprenum by supxXαx.

Time to prove that every set has a rank. We use ∈-induction. Suppose all the elements of A have ranks. Set α=supaA(rk(a)+1). As aA belongs to Vrk(a)+1 and VβVα whenever β≤α, all the elements of A belong to Vα. Therefore A belongs to Vα+1.

The reverse implication is straightforward, given this fact about rank: ab implies rk(a)<rk(b). (Proof: transfinite induction.) It follows that an element of A of lowest rank is ∈-minimal in A.

Prev TOC Next

Leave a comment

Filed under History, Set Theory